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COMMENTARY TO PROFESSOR MOLL'S
PRESENTATION
Brian Krumm
Good morning, my name is Brian Krumm, I am the director of the
Business Clinic and the Coach for the Closer and LawMeets®
transactional competition teams at the University of Tennessee College of
Law. I mention this because I tend to read cases from more of a practice
perspective than a doctrinal one. I have often felt that teaching law
students doctrine primarily from appellate decisions does not provide the
adequate context to allow them to fully appreciate the business decisions
and the lawyering that goes on in the deal process itself, as well as in the
courts below.
The 2020 decision of Energy TransferPartners, L.. v. EnterpriseProducts
Partners,L.P.,' provides just such an example. From a doctrinal perspective,
Professor Moll's legal analysis is spot on and raises some intriguing
questions potentially impacting the future of partnership law. From a
practice perspective, I view this case as not as much as one focused on
"contracting out of partnership" but as one of "preparing to enter into a
business relationship." While admittedly I have not reviewed the
underlying transactional documents, pleadings, discovery and appellate
briefs in this case, the text of the opinion can lend some insight into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the dispute, and which I feel are
crucial to understanding the context upon which the Supreme Court of
Texas rendered their decision. The following is a brief description of the
contemplated business transaction taken from the opinion.
PROVIDING CONTEXT

Because of increased oil production in the Dakota's and Canada, a
need arose to have pipeline capacity to carry oil from the traditional depot
in Cushing, Oklahoma to the south. Enterprise Products Partners, L.P.
(Enterprise)
initially
explored
potential
joint
ventures
with
ConnocoPhillips and Enbridge Energy to develop such a capability

1 593 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2020).
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without result. 2 In March 2011, Enterprise approached Energy Transfer
Partners (ETP) to convert the natural gas pipeline owned by ETP to carry
oil and extending it the rest of the way to Cushing.' The parties agreed to
explore the viability of the project. The parties entered into three written
agreements all of which reiterated their intent that neither party be bound
to proceed until each company's board of directors had approved the
execution of a formal contract.4 A Confidentiality Agreement was signed
in March 2011, stating that Enterprise and ETP were entering into
discussions with each other to explore a possible transaction involving a
joint venture to provide crude oil transportation from Cushing to
Houston. The agreement laid out the parties' rights and responsibilities
with respect to confidential information exchanged during the discussions
and then stated:
The Parties agree that unless and until a definitive agreement
between the Parties with respect to the Potential Transaction
has been executed and delivered, and then only to the extent of
the specific terms of such definitive agreement, no Party hereto
will be under any legal obligation of any kind whatsoever with
respect to any transaction by virtue of this Agreement or any
written or oral expression with respect to such a transaction by
any Party or their respective Representatives, except, in the case
of this Agreement, for the matters specifically agreed to herein
5

In April, 2011, the parties signed a Letter Agreement with an attached
"Non-Binding Term Sheet." The Letter Agreement indicated that the
parties were entering discussions regarding a proposed joint venture
transaction involving the construction and/or conversion and operation
of a pipeline to move crude oil from Cushing to Houston, and that the
letter was intended only to set forth the general terms of the transaction
between the parties, and attached a non-binding joint venture term sheet.
The letter stated:
Neither this letter nor the JV Term Sheet create any binding or
enforceable obligations between the Parties and, except for the
Confidentiality Agreement
593 S.W.3d at 734.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 593 S.W.3d at 735.
2

... , no binding or enforceable
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obligations shall exist between the Parties with respect to the
Transaction unless and until the Parties have received their
respective

board approvals
and definitive agreements
memorializing the terms and conditions of the Transaction
have been negotiated, executed and delivered by both of the
Parties. Unless and until such definitive agreements are executed
and delivered by both of the Parties, either [Enterprise] or ETP,
for any reason, may depart from or terminate the negotiations
with respect to the Transaction at any time without any liability
or obligation to the other, whether arising in contract, tort, strict
liability or otherwise.

The Non-Binding Term Sheet sketched out the basic features of the
potential transaction and envisioned that a "mutually agreeable Limited
Liability Company Agreement would be entered into" to govern the joint
venture, in the event that both Boards agreed to move forward with the
project.7
Finally, in April the parties also signed a Reimbursement Agreement
that provided the terms under which ETP would reimburse Enterprise for
half the cost of the project's engineering work.8 That agreement, like the
other two, recognized that the parties were "in the process of negotiating
mutually agreeable definitive agreements" for the project and stated that
nothing in it would "be deemed to create or constitute a joint venture, a
partnership, a corporation, or any entity taxable as a corporation,
partnership or otherwise." 9 ETP's pleadings acknowledge that "as of the
date of [these agreements]

. . . the parties had not yet formed a

0

partnership."1
By May, the parties had formed an integrated team to pursue the
feasibility of the project. The biggest piece of the puzzle was obtaining
sufficient shipping commitments. To do so, the parties needed to convince
shippers that their pipeline would be the first to market. During the spring
and summer of 2011, they marketed the project to potential customers as
a "50/50 JV" and prepared engineering plans for the project."
Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
6

Id.
10 Id.
" Id. The parties also explored the possibility of building a new pipeline from scratch

9

rather than retrofitting ETP's natural gas pipeline, but they continued to market the
natural gas pipeline conversion to potential customers. Id.
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A Federal Energy Regulatory Commission rule governing new
interstate pipelines requires an "open season" of 30 to 45 days in which
shippers are asked to commit to daily barrel volumes and tariffs. For the
project to be viable, the parties needed shipping commitments of at least
250,000 barrels a day for ten years at a tariff of $3.00 per barrel. The initial
open season was unsuccessful. 2 Enterprise ended its relationship with
ETP orally on August 15 and then in writing a few days later. 3
ConocoPhillips announced that it would sell its interest in the Seaway
pipeline a month later and Enbridge purchased the interest, making it coowner of the pipeline with Enterprise. '4 Enterprise and Enbridge obtained
an anchor shipper commitment from Chesapeake, which resulted in their
securing many additional commitments during the open season.
Enterprise and Enbridge invested billions to reverse the direction of the
pipeline and make other modifications needed to move oil from Cushing
to the Gulf.1 5 The new pipeline was a financial success.
ETP sued Enterprise and its theory at trial was that despite the
disclaimers in the parties' written agreements, they had formed a
partnership to "market and pursue" a pipeline through their conduct, and
Enterprise breached its statutory duty of loyalty by pursuing the project
with Enbridge. 6 The jury found that "ETP and Enterprise [had] create[d]
a partnership to market and pursue a pipeline project to transport crude
oil from Cushing, Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast" and also found that
Enterprise had not complied with its duty of loyalty. The court awarded

ETP $535,794,777.40 plus post judgment interest.17
12 593 S.W.3d at 736 Some shippers complained that the tariff was too high, others

that the real need was for a pipeline running all the way from Alberta to the Gulf Coast.
The parties extended the open season twice more. On the last day of the second extended
open season, August 12, Chesapeake Energy Corp. committed to ship 100,000 barrels
daily. ETP was hopeful that Chesapeake's commitment would draw in other shippers
who had been holding out. But days earlier, Enterprise had begun preparing its exit by
resuming negotiations with Enbridge. Id.
13

Id.

14 Id.
15

Id.

16

Id.

17 Id. The court found that $319,375,000 would compensate ETP for its damages
and that the value to Enterprise of the benefit gained as a result of its misconduct was

$595,257,433. The trial court reduced the disgorgement award to $150 million. Id. ETP
also sued Enbridge. However, the jury failed to find that Enbridge was part of a
conspiracy to breach Enterprise's duty of loyalty to ETP and as a result the jury did not
award a judgment against Enbridge. Id. at 742 n.5.
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The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Enterprise.' 8
The court concluded that the Texas Business Organizations Code
(TBOC) 9 allows parties to contract for conditions precedent to
partnership formation; that the Letter Agreement in particular created two
conditions that were not met (1) execution of definitive agreements
memorializing the terms and conditions of the Transaction and (2)
approval of each party's respective boards. ETP had the burden to either
obtain a jury finding that the conditions were waived or to prove waiver
conclusively, which it failed to do.
The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals and found
that "parties can conclusively negate the formation of a partnership under
Chapter 152 of the TBOC through contractual conditions precedent."20
The Court held that ETP and Enterprise had as a matter of law entered
into such agreements and there was no evidence presented that Enterprise
had waived the conditions precedent to the formation of a partnership."
A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE

I would like to start off by acknowledging the seriousness of this
inquiry. Having worked with a multitude of small start-up companies, and
also subsequently representing these start-ups in more complex business
relationships,
I recognize
the potential dangers
of allowing
unsophisticated parties to "contract out of partnership" and consequently
out of the default rules that were designed to protect not only the
participating parties, but also third parties that assume by the parties'
conduct that a partnership exists.
However, based on the facts that were presented at trial in this case,
these were sophisticated parties, represented by competent counsel, who
freely entered a series of contracts with each other to explore a projects
potential. Both parties clearly did not want to be bound together in a
partnership while they undertook the due diligence necessary to determine
if a joint venture was feasible. Much like other types of business
transactions between two companies such as an asset or stock purchase
agreements, the parties entered into a confidentiality and a non-binding
term sheet to determine if the project made financial sense before

Id.
1 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.205 (West 2006).
20 593 S.W.3d at 742.
18

21 Id.
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agreeing to create a limited liability company to undertake the
contemplated joint venture. There is also no mention of a "no-shop
provision"2 2 being included in any of the agreements or any other language
that would prevent either party to contemporaneously explore potential
project opportunities to transport oil with other companies.
During the due diligence process, it became clear that the project
simply was not going to be profitable. After three attempts to acquire
enough commitments to transport oil to justify the project as required by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 23 Enterprise notified ETP
that they were no longer interested in pursuing the project. 24 Soon
thereafter, Enterprise reentered discussing with Enbridge, a Canadian
company that recently acquired a half interest in an oil pipeline half owned
by Enterprise. 25 The two companies spent billions of dollars retrofitting
and extending the pipeline.26 The new pipeline was a financial success. 27
ETP became disgruntled with the realization that their competitor
ETP found a new partner to attempt to bring much needed capacity to
transport oil south to the refineries in Texas. This put ETP at a competitive
disadvantage in the industry. ETP filed suit against Enterprise alleging
breach of loyalty and conspiracy to breach Enterprise's duty of loyalty to
ETP.28 I speculate that since effective contract remedies29 were not
available because of the nature and language of the written agreements,
ETPs lawyers, being good advocates, resorted to pursuing the only theory
available to them, partnership law and breach of fiduciary duty.
At trial, ETP argued that the TCOB's totality-of the circumstances
test30 controls partnership formation at the exclusion of both the common

22

A no shop provision in this situation would be a contract clause which would

affirmatively state that the parties agree not to entertain other potential partners during
the term of the agreement to transport oil.
23

593 S.W.3d at 736.

24 Id.
2s

Id.
Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 740 n3. The trial court did not find that Enbridge was part of a conspiracy
26

to breach Enterprise's duty of loyalty to ETP. Id.
29 Contract remedies for breach of contract and tortious interference of contractual
relations by all indications were not pursued in this action.
30 "The submission of the case to the jury reflects this theory. Question 1 instructed
the jury on the rule of § 152.051(b) that parties can form a partnership even if they do
not intend to and on the multi-factor test in § 152.052(a). Question 1 also told the jury
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law and the intent of the parties. They also argued that parties through
contract language cannot avoid the creation the conduct that establishes
the inadvertent partnership under the statute. 31 Enterprise argued that
unless parties were free to contract to protect themselves from unwanted
partnership formation, there would be an increase in litigation to resolve
disputes as well as negative societal economic consequences. 32 These were
very difficult legal and policy issues for the jury to decide. As the Texas
Supreme Court noted, 33 amicus briefs were submitted by academics and
industry representatives on both sides of this issue, why should we expect
a lay jury to accurately weigh both the law and the policy decisions that
were presented on appeal.
In this particular fact scenario, a financially viable solution to transport
oil from Canada and the Midwest to Texas would not have occurred
without reliance on a contract that clearly spelled out the nature of the
limited fact finding relationship which was established by contract between
ETP and Enterprise. Billions of dollars were spent on the
Enterprise/Enbridge Project not only positively effecting the Texas
economy, but also to the local economies throughout the path of the
pipeline. If the Court of Appeals had not held, and the Texas Supreme
Court had not affirmed that opinion, it is my belief that ETP would have
been unjustly enriched in excess of $535 million dollars. ETP contributed
nothing the to the Enterprise/Enbridge project, yet they would be
rewarded by ignoring the agreed upon terms of the agreements, and
claiming inadvertent partnership.
While I agree with Professor Moll and others 34 who are concerned
about the potential negative effects of this decision could have on
unsophisticated parties, I am equally as concerned about two sophisticated
parties attempting to avoid a bargained for agreement, by claiming
inadvertent partnership. The appellate process in this case applying the

that "[n]o single fact may be stated as a complete and final test of partnership." It then
asked the jury whether a partnership was created." 593 S.W.3d at 740.
31

Id.

32 Id.

33 Id.

34 See generally Joseph K. Leahy, An LLC is the Key: The False Dichotomy Between
Inadvertent Partnershipsand Freedom of Contract, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 243 (2020).
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principles of law and equity came to the correct result. I believe that this
is one of those instances where hard facts make good law.35

35 This expression was first coined by the legal scholar Professor Arthur Corbin to
describe instances where the stated rule of law works an injustice in some cases. Corbin
describes how concepts of equity improves the law through the appeals process to arrive

at an equitable result. Arthur Linton Corbin, Hard Cases Make Good Law, 33 YALE L.J.
78-82 (1923).

